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Abstract: Currently Mobile Network Operators (MNO) rely on an authentication,
authorization and profile management architecture which has proved, by its
generalized use and acceptance, as being appropriate. The use of a secure
component, the SIM-Card, provides a set of capabilities not seen in other access
architectures and an advantage for MNOs. Nevertheless upcoming requirements in
terms of open interfaces, new services and customer demands are questioning the
actual architecture. This paper presents a novel approach to authentication and
profile management that can be reused by both MNOs and 3rd party providers to
answer the upcoming requirements. Here, a user is able to store his own identity
information in different places, while taking advantage of the strong authentication
mechanisms provided by the MNO. Furthermore, by integrating MNOs’ generic
authentication architecture with user-centric identity management, we are creating a 
generic way for service providers to reuse this authentication infrastructure, 
providing both single sign-on and strong authentication.
Keywords: 3GPP, Mobile Operators, Identity Management, Virtual Identity,
Authentication.
1. Introduction
In mobile networks, authentication and authorization mechanisms are currently built based 
on traditional, fixed telecommunication’s logic, but enhanced to handle roaming issues,
providing a way for customers to change their access networks. To provide roaming, a set 
of bilateral business agreements must exist between operators. This comprises the kernel of 
the Mobile operator industry’s trust model. The idea is that if a subscriber’s home operator
provides guarantees for its subscriber’s resource consumption (i.e. network usage), then a 
trusted visited operator will also offer its resources. Cross-operator payments are 
transparent for customers and a private matter between the home and foreign operators. The 
information stored in the customer’s profile (of increasingly value) always remains
confined to the home operator, even during roaming operations. 
This mechanism has been working for several years, but current trends are underlining 
its limitations. Users’ identification, associated identifiers and attributes, are still controlled
and limited to the operator’s domain: MNOs maintain all the authentication/authorization
functions closed, without external interactions. This fact affects user privacy and autonomy:
all the information about the user is stored and known by a single entity. No other provider 
(a 3
rd
 party provider) can reuse the users’ identifiers and attributes, stored in MNO’s AAA 
services, in order to offer new services to the users, thus reducing the set of services that
could otherwise be available to users. Consequently, 3
rd
 party providers are overcoming this 
problem by simply creating and maintaining their own AAA systems. This (simple)
solution has serious disadvantages for MNOs business: from an “owner of the customer”
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starting point, the MNO is being completely removed from the revenue chain – and as 
services become available across multiple technologies, the MNO is risking losing even its
transport role. Of course, even from the users’ point of view, this is not a good scenario as 
well: it introduces well-known issues for the users’ Identity Management  e.g. lack of 
support for SSO (Single Sign-On) between operators and 3
rd
 party services, identity silos,
etc...
To tackle the referred problems, MNOs should provide a set of open interfaces to their 
AAA domain – this information per se has business value, as it is well recognized already 
in Internet service provisioning. More than just solving a revenue-related problem, MNOs 
can introduce advantages for all the players. They have a commercial relation with the users
and own an important, widespread, and accepted secure token – the SIM card
1
,
implemented by an Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) device. With the use of the SIM card and 
the related infrastructure, a MNO can provide strong authentication mechanisms as a 
service for external players to use, giving advantages for all. Moreover, if willing, a MNO 
customer can also have his identity information spread along different trusted providers and 
use MNO’s strong authentication mechanisms to access such (and different) services, thus 
transforming a previous closed system into a user-centric IdM framework with added 
security mechanisms.
In this paper, we describe an architecture that repositions MNOs as central players in
the revenue chain, provide SSO for users and addresses privacy concerns by allowing users
to have their identity data spread along many trusted providers. In section 2, we present 
related work on identity management. Section 3 presents a basic overview on the 3GPP 
AAA mechanisms and associated identifiers, upon which we aim to base our proposal, 
while section 4 discusses our solution to the problem. Section 5 concludes our paper. 
2. Related Work
There are several ideas already for addressing Identities in a consistent way both in the
telecommunication and Internet domains. Of special relevance for the telecommunication
world, are efforts inside standardization organizations.
GSMA has recently started the work to standardize a set of high level interfaces to 
allow MNOs to expose their services (Charging, Identity, Messaging …) to 3rd party 
providers, through the OneAPI [2] initiative. This initiative tries to integrate, both 
Operators and Web domains, making it easier for new players to appear. The OneAPI work 
is stills immature – the MNO is considered only as a producer of information, rather than 
also a consumer. Nevertheless this is an interesting step to open MNOs interfaces to bring
telecommunication and Internet worlds together.
Another joint effort, between Liberty Alliance (LA) and 3GPP, proposed a set of
mechanisms to allow the integration of LA – Identity Federation and the Web Services
Framework with the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture, the reference for 3GPP [3]. This
integration offers a simplified sign-on and session management for complex web service 
business interaction protocols over a mechanism that provides shared secret and certificates
to two communicating entities for mobile applications. This work is a real progress towards
the integration of the telecommunication and Internet world. Nevertheless it lacks some
important points. It doesn’t support identity attributes split across different entities.
Customers still have to maintain all their attributes in the MNO domain – hindering 
privacy. Another important issue is the lack of support for attributes sharing between 
telecommunications and Internet domains – Only the telecommunication domain provides 
strong authentication mechanism.
1 SIM-card is a popular, short expression for “ICC device with Subscriber Identity Module”
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An interesting proposal extends the cellular authentication mechanism as a service. In 
[4] the authors discuss the 3GPP Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) solution, its 
implementation options, advantages and applicability. According to the authors, by reusing 
cellular authentication we are eliminating the critical step of provisioning the security 
credentials, or the distribution of smart cards, while proving a stronger authentication when 
compared to the normal username and passwords. 
3. 3GPP Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
2.1 Architecture 
The mobile world supports its AAA functions split in two different locations: in an ICC 
device (the SIM card for 2G and USIM card for 3G networks); and in network-side
elements, the HLR (Home Location Repository) and AuC (Authentication Centre) 
functional entities. The first one contains and manages all subscriber identifiers, while the 
second maintains and handles security and authentication information (authentication 
vectors and roaming access keys). If an IMS (IP Multimedia Sub-system) is added to the 
cellular system, a new function called HSS (Home Subscriber System) appears to include 
some functions of the HLR.
3GPP GAA (Generic Authentication Architecture) VI has been defined by 3GPP to 
accomplished advanced authentication and security procedures in GPRS/UMTS networks.
This development started in the 3GPP Release 6 [5]. Note that the GAA by itself does not 
provide services such as SSO, only secrets sharing between users and network. 
Figure 1: Generic Authentication Architecture
Figure 1 shows GAA entities and their interfaces. The UE (User Equipment) and the 
Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) use the HTTP Digest AKA protocol for mutual 
authentication, over the Ub interface. They also agree on session keys that are afterwards
applied between the UE and the Network Application Function (NAF) over the Ua 
interface. Those keys are restricted to a specific NAF. The Zn interface enables the NAF to
verify if a UE was correctly authenticated against the BSF. NAF represents the HTTP or
HTTPS service that requires 3GPP authentication. NAF can be divided in two parts – 
Authentication Proxy (AP) and the Application Server (AS). In such a case, the AP is only 
responsible for the authorization of the client, while the AS implements the application’s 
functionality, relying in the authentication provided by the AP.
BSF uses the Zh interface to retrieve users’ profile information from the HSS entity. 
That information is part of the users’ identity (Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
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2.2 Identifiers 
Associated with the subscriber there are several identifiers used for different purposes, 
stored and maintained by different entities [6]. Figure 2 provides a graphical view of the 
distribution of the most important identifiers among different components. The IMSI is the 
subscriber number; the ICCID is the SIM-card’s serial number; the IMEI is the handset 
serial number. The IMSI and the ICCID, along with OTA (over-the-air) keys used for 
management operations, are stored in the HLR and in the SIM-Card. The IMEI is stored in 
the handset (typically it is also stored in the HLR for maintenance purposes).
Figure 2: Generic Identifiers Distribution
The AuC mainly stores security data, the authentication vectors and a set of keys used 
to authenticate the client and to protect the radio link between the handset and the base-
stations. In IMS-enabled networks, the HSS is an enhanced HLR which stores the IMPI and 
IMPUs. Those are the IP Multimedia Private (IMPI) and Public identifiers (IMPUs) of the 
subscriber. A subscriber has an IMPI and can have several IMPUs. The idea is to protect 
the subscriber private identifier. One or more Service Profiles may exist associated with 
each IMPU to specify the service’s subscription a user has contracted (Figure 3). Full 
mapping between all identifiers and the subscriber is only available to the MNO. 
Figure 3: Relation between IMS identifiers, subscription and service profiles [7]
2.3 3GPP bootstrapping 
The GAA describes the framework for the AAA mobile network architecture. Within the
GAA, the Authentication Bootstrapping Procedure [9] (GBA) VI describes the functions 
and the process used for user authentication. 
When the UE wants to interact with the NAF, it starts communication with NAF over 
Ua interface without GBA parameters (Figure 4). If the NAF requires the use of shared 
keys obtained by means of GBA, but the request from UE does not include GBA related
parameters, the NAF replies with a bootstrapping initiation message. 
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After this the UE sends an HTTP request to the BSF and the BSF retrieves the complete
set of GBA user security settings and one Authentication Vector (AV) over the reference
point Zh from the HSS. Part of the values retrieved from the HSS is sent to the UE in the
401 message. The UE verifies if the challenge is from an authorized network and calculates 
a session key. A key is also generated in the BSF, which receives a HTTP request with the
Digest AKA response. The BSF authenticates the UE by verifying the Digest AKA 
response. The BSF generates key material and the B-TID (Bootstrapping Transaction 
Identifier) which is used to bind the subscriber identity to the keying material in reference
points Ua, Ub and Zn. Finally, the BSF shall send a 200 OK message, including the B-TID 
to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication and the key’s lifetime.
Figure 4: Authentication Bootstrapping Procedure Figure 5: Bootstrapping application
If the UE and the NAF agree on using bootstrapping, the UE starts communication over 
reference point Ua with the NAF by supplying the B-TID to the NAF to it to retrieve the 
corresponding keys from the BSF (Figure 5). The NAF requests to the BSF, key material
corresponding to the B-TID supplied by the UE. With the key material request, the NAF 
shall supply NAF’s public hostname that UE has used to access NAF to BSF, and BSF shall 
be able to verify that NAF is authorized to use that hostname. The NAF may also request
one or more application-specific USSs for the applications, which the request received over 
Ua from UE may access.
4. IdM Open Systems Integration/Interworking with 3GPP 
The 3GPP GAA, albeit powerful, has several limitations, as we have identified in previous 
sections. However, the integration of an open Identity Management system into 3GPP, in a
path along the lines suggested by LA, may be a powerful mechanism for MNOs. 
4.1 Virtual identities and virtual identifiers 
The framework proposed here provides users with the ability to define profiles that can
aggregate authentication credentials and attributes from different identity providers. This
group of information is called a user profile or virtual identity. Users can refer to this
profile by means of a Virtual Identifier (VID) when accessing a target service [8].
Figure 6 shows the relationship between VID, User Profile, authentication credentials
and user attributes.
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A User Profile references to one Authentication ID (AuthN ID), and therefore to the
authentication credentials requested during the authentication process. Moreover, it might
contain references (AttrIDs) to several attributes held by different attribute providers.  For 
example, Alice might define a User Profile referring her identity defined in her home
network provider, such as alice@homeprovider.com. At the same time, this profile can hold 
the attribute connection_type defined in her home network as premium, and the attribute
role defined as vipclient, held by another attribute provider where Alice has another 
account.
The VID can be seen as a piece of information that references to a user profile, and 
includes information about the domain where the VID was created. In the example given
above, alice@aggregator.org may represent a VID from the domain aggregator.org pointing 
to the profile identified by Alice. For privacy reasons, when an end user requests access to 
some services, the user profile pointer will be replaced by a protected (encrypted) identifier
or artifact, so only the Aggregator ID will be disclosed to Service Providers. 
Figure 6: User Profile content
4.2 IdM Framework Elements 
The Identity Management framework defines elements that can be seen as roles potentially
played by one or different parties, depending on the business model. That is, we do not 
provide a specific instantiation of these elements but just a description of their functionality.
 An End User is an entity who has at least one subscription with an Authentication
Provider or Attribute Provider. Relatively to that provider, the end user has an identifier and
a set of attributes associated with that identifier. For authentication reasons, the end user has 
to know some authentication credentials.
 A Service Provider protects the resources being shared across the federation. They 
make use of Identity Providers (authentication, attribute or aggregator) in order to verify the 
identifiers (including VIDs) presented by the end users and to retrieve the attributes needed
to determine an authorization decision. 
 An Authentication Provider is used to prove the identity of the end users. Therefore,
users must have a previous subscription with this provider and must share some kind of 
authentication credentials, which will be used by the end user for proving a legitimate
ownership of a given VID. 
 An Attribute Provider is responsible for managing user attribute data. The information
managed by these providers can be related to specific services or can be for general 
purpose.
 The Identity Aggregator is responsible for the management of user profiles, VIDs and 
SSO mechanisms and statements on behalf of the user. Identity Aggregators can maintain
different federation agreements with the Authentication and Attribute Providers related to
the Virtual Identities.
Moreover the Identity Management framework builds upon a federation between trusted 
parties, belonging to different domains, were service agreements are established and all 
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security related countermeasures are deployed with the main goal of always preserving 
users privacy, by assuring the unlinkability of users identities/pseudonyms across all 
interactions performed by the user inside the  framework.
4.3 3GPP GBA/ IdM Interworking 
For the interworking of such an Identity Management (IdM) framework with the 3GPP 
GBA, we need to define the functional interrelations. The Authentication Provider  will be
used as a Network Application Function (NAF) that provides identity and SSO services. It 
behaves as a NAF using the 3GPP GAA and related interfaces to authenticate the End User, 
and then generating the necessary credentials needed by the End User to access a Service
Provider. Here a federation has to exist between the IdM and MNO domain where 3GPP 
interfaces and related protocols are used in the interactions between the IdM framework
elements and 3GPP entities. Do to the nature of this IdM framework, where functional 
entities are separated in a fine grained structure, it provides a flexible way for mapping IdM 
related interactions on top of existing network architectures, although such mapping is out 
of scope of this paper.
Figure 7 details this operation, based on the identity management system defined inside 
the SWIFT (Secure Widespread Identities for Federated Telecommunications) project [1] 
SWIFT aims to design a user-centric identity and privacy framework, which improves the 
LA approaches in terms of where attributes are stored and shared, thus enhancing overall 
user’s privacy. 
Access Request
SWIFT Initiation
Statement
Artifact
Aggregator ID
End User
Identity
Aggregator
Service
Provider
AuthN Request
SWIFT Initiation
Statement?
AuthN Request
Figure 7: Identity Management/GBA Interworking
Overall, the interoperation can be described as: 
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1. The End User starts by sending an Access Request to the Service Provider. 
2. The Service Provider redirects the End User to the Identity Aggregator with an 
Authentication Request Message. 
3. At the Identity Aggregator, the End User is redirected to the Authentication Provider, 
that plays the role of a Network Application function, with an Authentication Request 
message.
4. The Authentication Provider receives the message and starts the authentication process. 
Now the Authentication Provider, playing the role of a NAF, makes use of the 3GPP 
GAA to authenticate the End User. 
5. The Authentication Provider/NAF uses the 3GPP GAA to request credentials needed to 
create the Authentication Response. 
6. The Authentication Provider redirects the EU to the Identity Aggregator, with an 
Authentication Statement for the Identity Aggregator.
7. After receiving the Authentication Statement, the Identity Aggregator redirects the End 
User to the Service Provider, with an Authentication Response, a SWIFT SSO 
Statement, and an Authentication Statement for the Service Provider. 
In a user-centric IdM environment, like SWIFT, the end user should be able to have
complete control over who authenticates him, who manages his VIDs and user profiles, 
where his attributes are stored, and policies for attribute sharing. Current IdM frameworks
already support these features providing a simple SSO user experience. However, most IdM 
frameworks nowadays lack support for strong authentication of end users VID, relying only 
on user name and password. IdM frameworks can overcome this problem by simply
interworking with the 3GPP GBA. By doing this, the IdM can eliminate the need for
provision of security credentials, and can rely in a well-know, widely deployed, strong 
authentication mechanism. In this case the MNO is used as a provider of authentication
services, which open a new business area for MNOs.
The main advantage of co-allocating the Network Application Function with the
Authentication Provider is to allow the end user to have several Authentication Providers 
for the same VID. Thus, the end user can use the GBA for strong seamless authentication 
when using a 3GPP enabled device; or can make use of GBA for a two level authentication
when, for instance, the level of assurance calculated by the Service Provider is too low 
(then it can ask the End User to prove his identity by using a stronger authentication
method, in this case 3GPP GBA). This would also enable split-terminal functionalities: the 
end user could still perform a GBA authentication when using a terminal that does not 
include a UICC (such as a laptop). In this case the end user would use another 3GPP 
terminal (for instance a mobile phone) and GBA to provide the necessary credentials to 
access the Service Provider while using the service in a laptop.
5. Conclusion 
This paper presented a way in which Mobile Network customers can use their identity 
information, stored in different providers, while taking advantage of the strong 
authentication mechanisms, provided by MNOs. This proposal brings the flexibility of
Internet-style IdM systems with the trust of 3GPP GAA systems, opening a new business 
area for MNOs. The complexity of the solution seems to be minimal, and mostly a matter of 
interface specifications. 
The presented architecture and mechanisms are being studied within the IST-SWIFT
project, where a set of prototypes is being develop to evaluate the solution. The proposed 
solution presents a novel approach backed up by the SWIFT IdM framework which allows 
a user to maintain its attributes across several Attributes Providers as well as the ability to 
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use multiple authentication methods through Authentication Providers associated to a given
VID. These unique characteristics of the SWIFT IdM framework, together with the fact that
this is a new field of research, makes it difficult to perform a comparative quantitative
analysis with the reduced number existing proposals. 
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